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Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through
it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession.
Many are plainly harmless; some appear ominously
harmful. Some, for all the benign appearance of their
spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of followers that
deplete trials of fairness.... So an inquiry into what makes

an error harmless, though one of philosophical tenor, is also
an intensely practical inquiry into the health and sanitation
of the law.
Roger J. Traynor t
I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of harmless error and its mirror image, harmful
error, generally are given short shrift in law school. Despite the
pragmatic importance of the subject, most law school professors
and casebooks devote to it little, if any, time,2 other than to briefly
inform students that harmless error will not be grounds for
appellate reversal and that harmful error is error that affects the
"substantial rights" of the parties.3 The reasons for this intellectual
1. ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLEss ERROR at ix (1970).

2. See, e.g., JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, CASES & MATERIALS ON

EVIDENCE 52- 60 (8&ed. 1995) (discussing FRE 103(a) with no discussion on the
harmless error rule).
3. See FED. R. EViD. 103(a) ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected."); FED. R. Civ. P. 61 ("No error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial
or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing
a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."); 28 U.S.C. S 2111 ("On the hearing of any
appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an
examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect
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silence are varied. First, the law school courses most likely to
address the topic-civil procedure and evidence-are overflowing
with numerous conceptually challenging topics, leaving little
pedagogical time for meaningful discussion of something as
seemingly arcane as harmless error. Second, the law of harmless
error itself is much more complex than it initially appears, making
accurate and thorough instruction on the subject difficult, even
assuming the time was available. The resulting intellectual void is
both pervasive and perverse. Very few lawyers-and hence,
judges-know much about harmless error, and their ignorance fuels
perversities such as poor legal argument, unfocused reasoning, and
seemingly inconsistent judicial decisions. In an attempt to fill the
current intellectual void, this article explicates a broad-ranging,
coherent synthesis of the law of harmless error in Michigan.
]I. WHAT ISHARMLESS ERRoR?

Harmless error rules are, essentially, proxies for the level of
assurance that an appellate court must have before it is permitted to
set aside the judgment below. How a jurisdiction defines harmless
error will thus reveal a good deal about how comfortable (or
uncomfortable) policymakers in the jurisdiction feel about trial
error, and correspondingly, how severe such error must be before
it will result in appellate reversal. Harmless error analysis is thus
perhaps best viewed as a quest to determine whether the trial
resulted in a judgment that is manifestly just; if the judgment is
deemed just, the error is deemed harmless, and the judgment will
stand. In a very real sense, therefore, the standard for harmless error
that is adopted will reflect a policy decision as to what constitutes
"justice" at the trial level.
Attempting to define "justice" is, of course, a highly subjective
task, since the term means different things to different people and
varies further according to the facts. If we assume, therefore, that
harmless error jurisprudence is designed to further trial court
the substantial rights of the parties.").
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"justice" (and hence to overturn only those judgments that are
"unjust"), we must necessarily ask ourselves what we mean when
we use the word "justice." Is our quest for justice, for example,
limited to making sure that the rightresult was reached at the trial
level? Or is justice about something more- such as ensuring that
the trial was conducted in a fair manner? Does, in other words, the
appearanceof justice have value, even if the resultreached at the trial
level is most likely correct?
At early common law, getting the "right result" seemed almost
irrelevant, and the appearance of justice reigned supreme. The
"Exchequer Rule" of the early English courts- subsequently
embraced by American courts-presumed that all trial errors were
harmful, thus requiring a new trial.4 In this atmosphere, reversals
for relatively minor trial errors were commonplace. For example,
in 1880, the California Supreme Court, in People v. St. Clair,
reversed a conviction for larceny because the indictment charged
the defendant with entry into a building "with intent to commit
larcey."6 The court reasoned that because there was no such crime
as "larcey," the indictment was fatally flawed, failing to charge the
defendant with a specific criminal offense.7 Likewise, in
Commonwealtb v. Carney,8 the defendant was indicted for
assaulting and beating James Hartman.9 The Supreme Court of
Virginia quashed the indictment because it failed to specify that the
offense had been committed "against the peace and dignity of the
Commonwealth."1 The Wisconsin Supreme Court took a similar

4. See WAYNER. LAFAVE &JEROLDH.ISRAEi, CRIMINALPROcEDURE995

(1985).
5. 56 Cal. 406 (1880).

6. Id at 407.
7. See id ("[T]his is more than a departure from an established form ;... it
is a failure to describe an offense.").
8. 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 546 (1847).
9. See id

10. Id at 547. See also Williams v. State, 27 Wis. 402 (1871) (reversing
conviction for failure of indictment, which merely specified that offense was
committed "against the peace of and dignity of the state").
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view in Williams v. State," reversing a conviction against a
defendant indicted for an offense committed "against the peace of
the State of Wisconsin. " 2 The indictment's seemingly trivial failure
to specify that the offense was "against the peace anddignity of the
State" proved fatal. 3 Even as recently as 1945, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals set aside a murder conviction due to a
maddeningly technical error. In Gragg v. State, 4 the defendant's
indictment charged him with killing his wife, Flora. Specifically,
the indictment stated that Gragg had "drowned" his wife." The
error warranting reversal, according to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, was the failure of the indictment to allege the
"means" by which the drowning was accomplished, other than
merely water."
These early common law cases exemplify an obsession with the
appearance of justice, perhaps to the exclusion of justice itself.
Focusing exclusively on the appearance of justice thus gave rise to
a harmless error jurisprudence intolerant of even the most trivial
trial court errors, indicating relative disinterest in ensuring that the
right resultwas reached. Modem harmless error jurisprudence, on
the other hand, is largely a reaction to the hyper-technical nature of
early common law. As with most other areas of the law, the
concept of harmless error fluctuates over time, much like a
11. 27 Wis. 402 (1871).
12. Id
13. See id at 403 (emphasis added). The court based its decision on a
provision of the Wisconsin Constitution which states that "all indictments shall
conclude against the peace and dignity of the state." Id It thus concluded that it
had no authority to disregard what it viewed as a mandatory constitutional
requirement. See id
14. 186 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Grim. App. 1945).
15. Seeid at 247.
16. See id. Specifically, the court concluded that "there should be an
averment of some overt act of the accused which brought about the drowning
of his wife, if such act is known. To illustrate, that he pushed her from the bank
into the water, or that he pushed her out of a boat into the water, or held her
head under the water." Id
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pendulum swinging back and forth in reaction to the social and
political forces around it. Thus, the harshness of early common law
harmless error jurisprudence, with its emphatic emphasis on
technicality over substance, marked one extreme of the pendulum
swing. Ineluctably, perhaps, the pendulum is now swinging back,
away from technicality, towards an emphasis on ensuring that trials
reach the "right result." If the trial result appears substantively
correct (i.e., in accordance with the evidence), the modem trend in
Michigan is to let the trial judgment stand, even if the trial court
committed errors-even constitutional errors-along the way.

mII. MICHIGAN STANDARDS OF HARMLESS ERROR
Modem harmless error analysis in Michigan involves
consideration of four statutory and rule-based standards: (1) the
criminal harmless error statute;1 7 (2) the civil procedure rule; s (3)
the rule of evidence;19 and (4) the plain error doctrine." Although
there is great similarity in the language employed by each of these
harmless error standards, the case law interpreting these rules and
statutes varies widely.
In the criminal context, the applicable harmless error statute,
section 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,21 states that "[n]o
judgment or verdict shall be set aside.., in any criminal case...
unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the
entire cause, it shall affirmatively appearthat the errorcomplainedof
has resulted in a miscarriageofjustice. , In the civil context, the
applicable rule of procedure states that "[a]n error.., is not ground
for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for . . .
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this

17. See MICH. COMP. LAWS 769.26 (1979).
18. See MICH. CT. R. 2.613.
19. See MICH. R. EvID. 103(a).
20. See MICH. R. EVID. 103(d).
21. MICH. COMP. LAWS 769.26 (1979).
22. I (emphasis added).
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action appears to the court inconsistent with substantialjustice. 2
For errors predicated on the admission or exclusion of evidence, the
applicable rule states that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantialright
of theparty is affected, and [a timely objection or offer of proof has
been made.]"24 Finally, the plain error doctrine states that
"[n]othing in this rule [of evidence] precludes taking notice ofplain
errorsaffectingsubstantialrights although they were not brought to
the attention of the court.- 25
Looking at the language of these four harmless error standards,
a salient question arises: Is there any difference among them? Is
there, in other words, a substantive distinction to be drawn
between error which results in a "miscarriage of justice" (criminal
statute) versus error that is "inconsistent with substantial justice"
(civil procedure rule) versus error which affects a "substantial right"
(evidentiary rulings)? All four standards appear to hinge upon the
word "justice," which, as has already been pointed out, is a highly
subjective term. But is an error which results in a "miscarriage of
justice" (criminal statute) a qualitatively different beast than an
error which is "inconsistent with substantial justice" (civil
procedure rule)? Would all miscarriages of justice, in other words,
necessarily be inconsistent with substantial justice? Or is the
addition of the word "substantial" in the civil procedure rule
intended to place greater limitations on reversals for harmful error
in civil trials? Moreover, is an error which affects a "substantial
right" (rule of evidence) somehow different in kind from an error
which miscarries or substantially affects justice? Could, in other
words, an error affect a substantial right of the parties and yet have
no effect on "justice"?
These kinds of questions naturally arise in the mind of a welltrained lawyer who reads the four Michigan harmless error
standards. One finds oneself wondering: Why have four standards?
And moreover, why have four standards which use similar, but not
23. MICH. CT. R. 2.613 (emphasis added).
24. MCH. R. EVID. 103(a) (emphasis added).
25. MCH. R. EVID. 103(d) (emphasis added).
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identical, language? Undertaking research with the hope of
uncovering a logical explanation for the differing language is in
vain. There does not appear to be any conscious effort by the
drafters of any of these four standards to harmonize the standards
with the other standards, nor to explain why different language was
chosen. Michigan lawyers and judges, therefore, are left to struggle
over these diaphanous words with virtually no guidance as to their
meaning-and struggle they have.
IV. UNPRESERVED ERROR

Any explanation of harmless error should begin with an
explanation of its legal cousin, plain error. The Michigan Rule of
Evidence dealing with plain error does not attempt to define the
term; rather, it merely states that "[n]othing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plainerrorsaffectingsubstantialrightsalthough they
were not brought to the attention of the court. ''26 From this
language, it is evident that four requisites exist for plain error: (1)
there must have been an error committed by the trial court; (2) the
error must be "plain"; (3)the error must affect a "substantial right";
and (4) the error was not brought to the attention of the court (i.e.,
it was not preserved by an appropriate objection or offer of proof).
Assuming that an error has been committed, and that the error was
not properly preserved, the salient questions therefore become: (1)
what do we mean by "plain"?; and (2) what do we mean when we
say that the error must affect a "substantial right"?
In People v. Grant,' the Michigan Supreme Court cited with
approval the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of "plain" error from
United States v. Olano,2 1 which concluded that "plain" error was
"synonymous with 'clear' or, equivalently, 'obvious error."'" The
Grant court also concluded that an unpreserved error affects a
"substantial right" if the error "could have been decisive of the
26. Id
27. 520 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 1994).
28. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
29. Id at 734.
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outcome or... [if the error] falls under the category of cases, yet to
be clarly defined, where prejudice is presumed or reversal is
automatic." 0
Plain error thus emerges from Grantas an obvious error-plain
for the world to see, even without a proper objection or offer of
proof being made-that is potentially outcome decisive or
presumptively prejudicial. Harmful error that is not properly
preserved by the party will therefore be grounds for appellate
reversal only if the error was so plain that proper preservation is
not needed to facilitate appellate review, and the error is so
prejudicial that it is likely outcome determinative. The focus in the
context of plain error therefore appears to be with making sure the
right result is reached (outcome determination), not a broader
concern about preserving the appearance of justice. 1
This narrower conception of harmful error is likely warranted
by a couple of factors present in the plain error context that are not
present in other harmful error contexts. First, because plain error
is, by definition, error which has not been properly preserved by
the party claiming error, the harmed party has, to a certain extent,
"dirty hands"-a degree of culpability not normally present with
other types of harmful error. The trial error, in other words, is
partially the fault of the party claiming error because that party
failed to voice an objection or make an offer of proof that would
have allowed the trial court to make a proper ruling. Because the
party claiming error thus shares culpability for the error, the plain
30. Grant, 520 N.W.2d at 131.
31. Indeed, the Grant court cited with approval Chief Justice Rehnquist's
statement inUnited States v. Mechanik that
The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces

jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend
further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has

already once taken place ....Thus, while reversal "may, in theory,
entitle the defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the
accused with complete freedom from prosecution," and thereby "cost
society the right to punish admitted offenders."
Id. at 130 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986) (citations
omitted)).
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error doctrine is designed to minimize appellate reversal in his
favor to those situations where the error was likely ouicome
determinative. Second, because the error has not been properly
preserved (through an objection or offer of proof), the appellate
court will not have any record upon which to base its review.
Rather, the appellate court necessarily has to rely upon the
"obviousness" of the error and attempt to divine, as best it can,
whether and to what extent the error may have affected the trier of
fact. The lack of a record thus impedes the appellate court's ability
to conduct an appropriate review, which, in turn, creates a
hesitation to reverse in such situations absent a conviction by the
appellate court that the error likely affected the outcome. Because
of the inherent difficulty in reviewing an error that was not
preserved below-and the fact that the difficulty was caused, in part,
by the party raising the error on appeal-the standard for plain
error is a parsimonious one focused on outcome determination.
The culpability of the party claiming error also helps predict and
explain who bears the burden of proving the elements of plain error
on appeal. The Grant court adopted the position of the U.S.
Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Olano,3 2which made it clear that
the party complaining of an unpreserved error bears the burden of
proving that the error was both plain and potentially outcome
determinative.3
Although the elements and burden of proof in plain error are
relatively clear, the application of those elements and carrying the
burden is not. Whether an unpreserved error is sufficiently
"obvious" to warrant appellate review and whether it potentially
affected the outcome are inherently complex questions upon which
reasonable minds can, and often do, differ. Generalizations are
difficult, other than perhaps to state that a court is more likely to
find plain error in a criminal case (particularly involving an error
affecting the accused's constitutional rights) than a civil case, and
even then it is a relatively rare occurrence. 4 As with the rest of
32. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
33. See Grant, 520 N.W.2d at 131; Olano, 507 U.S. at 741.
34. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 211-212 (4th ed. 1992).
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harmless error jurisprudence, plain error analysis is heavily factdependent and difficult to define or predict. "In the end, precision
seems beyond reach. Verbal formulae do little to help distinguish
between ordinary and plain error in degree of seriousness or
obviousness, nor to explain when errors adversely affect the
Decisions finding plain error or
integrity of the system ....
rejecting claims of 35such error reflect little more than the
conclusions reached.

V. CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR

An important distinction in harmless error jurisprudence is
made between constitutional and non-constitutional error, each of
which has its own legal standards and case law. A constitutional
error is an error which results in the violation of the party's
constitutional rights; a non-constitutional error does not.
Constitutional errors that violate a party's federal (as opposed to
state) constitutional rights-as the vast majority of constitutional
errors do-oblige state courts to look to federal precedents
explicating harmless error.36 Constitutional errors, moreover, are
intellectually bifurcated into two categories: (1) structural; and (2)
non-structural errors.
A. StructuralConstitutionalErrors
Structural constitutional errors have been described by the U.S.
Supreme Court as "a] structural defect [I in the constitution of the
trial mechanism, which defties] analysis by 'harmless error'
standards. ' 37 Furthermore, structural errors are "so basic to a fair
trial" that they "can never be deemed as harmless."3" As such, the
U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that, given their serious
35. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 29-30
(2d ed. 1999).

36. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967).
37. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).
38. Ghapman, 386 U.S. at 23.
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nature, structural errors are the "exception and not the rule"

amongst constitutional errors.39 More importantly, once a
constitutional trial error has been identified as structural, automatic
reversal of the conviction is required.' Structural constitutional
errors are, therefore, of such a serious nature that they will result
in appellate reversal, regardless of whether the error was preserved
at the trial level.
The basic description of structural error- an error that is never
harmless-is, of course, circular; it essentially begs the question of
how to identify such per se harmful errors. The Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding structural errors is, therefore, a sort of "we
know it when we see it" decision making found in other complex
areas of the law, such as obscenity. But despite the diaphanous
descriptions of structural error, the Court has provided pragmatic
guidance by identifying several examples of structural errors,
including the use of coerced confessions,41 complete deprivation of
the right to trial counsel,42 the use of a biased or partial judge, 43 and
directing a verdict against the criminal defendant." Other examples
include systematic exclusion of grand jurors who are of the same
race as the defendant;4 denial of the right of self-representation; 4'
denial of the right to a public trial;47 and providing a
constitutionally improper reasonable doubt jury instruction.48
B. Non-structuralConstitutionalErrors
Not all constitutional errors, however, require automatic
reversal. Non-structural constitutional errors may be-indeed, often
39. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986).
40. See People v. Anderson, 521 N.W.2d 538 (Mich. 1994).
41. SeeRose, 478 U.S. at 577 (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)).
42. See id (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
43. See id (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
44. See id at 578.
45. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986).
46. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984).
47. See Wailer v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984).
48. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993).
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are-deemed harmless. Thus, although a party's constitutional
rights may have been infringed, the categorization of certain
constitutional errors as non-structural is a statement that such
errors are not as inherently prejudicial and that "there can be no
such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and that the Constitution
does not guarantee such a trial."49
A non-structural-or "trial type"-constitutional error has been
described as an error that "occurs during the presentation of the
case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed
in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine
whether its admission was harmless."o As such, they do not require
automatic reversal (as do structural errors), but rather are subject to
a harmless error standard that requires the prosecutor to prove that
the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."-"
The "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for nonstructural constitutional errors is a demanding one, requiring that
the party seeking to affirm the trial verdict convince the appellate
court that the error did not affect the verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt. The presumption, therefore, is that non-structural
constitutional errors are prejudicial, and the prosecutor bears a
heavy burden of convincing the appellate court otherwise. Given
the relative gravity of the error involved, the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard for non-structural constitutional error is thus a
compromise between the harshness of the automatic reversal rule
for structural error and the laxity of lesser standards (e.g., "more
probable than not") that would result in a greater number of
affirmances. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard thus
indicates that the appearance of justice is important, just not as
important in the structural error context.5 2
49. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983) (citing Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973)).
50. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.
51. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
52. Accord LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 4, at 1006 (concluding that the
Chapman "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard "clearly rejected a 'correct
result' test [for harmless error].").
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Most constitutional trial errors are thus non-structural in
nature, particularly those constitutional errors involving the
admission or exclusion of evidence, and are therefore not subject to
automatic reversal. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified
numerous examples of non-structural errors, including: the
admission of a statement to a police officer in violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel;5 3 denial of an
accused's right to cross-examination; 4 comments by the
prosecution, in violation of the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, regarding an accused's failure to testify; 5 the
admission of a statement by one defendant identifying and
incriminating another (in violation of the Bruton doctrine);56 the
admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment;57 and the admission of involuntary confessions.58
Lower courts have expanded the list of non-structural errors to
include such things as the admission of hearsay in violation of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause;59 the admission of
statements obtained in violation of an accused's Fifth Amendment
Mirandarights;' and the admission of the post-Mirandasilence of
an accused.61
One of the most significant Michigan cases involving nonstructural constitutional error is a 1994 decision by the Michigan
Supreme Court, People v. Anderson.0 In Anderson, the defendant
was charged with first degree criminal sexual conduct against his
nine year-old daughter.' Shortly after the defendant's arrest (and
53. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972).
54. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 683-84 (1986).
55. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-12 (1983).

56. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973).
57. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970).
58. See Fulminante,499 U.S. at 310.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 944 (2d Cir. 1991).
60. See, e.g., Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1022 (2d Cir. 1989).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1549-50 (11th Cir.
1991).

62. 521 N.W.2d 538 (Mich. 1994).
63. See id. at 540.
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after his Mirandarights had been given), the defendant informed an
officer that he had had "sexual thoughts about his daughter.1" 4 The
prosecutor at trial attempted to introduce this post-arrest
inculpatory statement; defense counsel objected to the statement's
admission on grounds that the statement was obtained in violation
of the defendant's right to counsel.6" The trial judge held a mid-trial
evidentiary hearing, overruled the objection, and admitted the
statement.66 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
judge's ruling in an unpublished, per curiam decision.6'
The Michigan Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
defendant's conviction." The court agreed that the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights were violated,69 yet the court found that
this error was non-structural in nature and hence, subject to a
harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.7 Applying this
standard to the case at bar, the court characterized the erroneously
admitted statement as "an inculpatory and highly prejudicial
admission"'" and reasoned that, given the effect of the statement on
the defendant's credibility, it could not conclude "beyond a
reasonable doubt that this inadmissible evidence did not tip the
scale in favor of the prosecution and contribute to the jury's
verdict.

' 72

C. ConstitutionalErrors:Directvs. HabeasReview
Another important distinction to be drawn in the area of
constitutional error is the difference between errors complained of
on direct review versus those complained of on habeas corpus
64. Id at 541 (emphasis omitted).
65. See id at 542.
66. See id at 541.
67. See id at 542, n.18.
68. See id at 54546.

69. See id at 544.
70. See id at 545.
71. Id

72. Ia at 546.
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review. The U.S. Supreme Court's five-four decision in Brecht v.
Abrahamson73 delineates the significance of this distinction. Brecht
involved an instance of non-structural constitutional
error-specifically, the prosecutorial use of post-Mirandasilence to
impeach the criminal defendant.74 The Court was specifically asked
to decide whether the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard 5 pronounced in Chapmanv. Californiafor non-structural
constitutional error was the appropriate standard for use in
reviewing such errors on habeas, as opposed to direct, review. A
majority of the Court held that the Chapman "harmless beyond
reasonable doubt" standard is inapplicable on habeas review; the
proper standard in such cases comes instead from Kotteakos v.
United States,76 which held that error is harmful if it has a
"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict."' Thus, habeas petitioners are not entitled to relief
based upon trial court errors "unless they can establish that [such
7
error(s)] resulted in 'actual prejudice."'
The Brecht Court reasoned that the "Kotteakos harmless error
standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral
review than the Chapman standard, and application of a less
onerous harmless-error standard on habeas promotes the
considerations underlying our habeas jurisprudence." 79 Specifically,
because convictions being reviewed collaterally are "presumptively
correct," the Court concluded that imposing a heavy burden on the
prosecution to prove that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt would "undermine[] the States' interest in finality
and infringe[] upon their sovereignty over criminal matters.
73. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
74. The use of post-Mirandasilence of an accused was held to violate the
Constitution inDoylev. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Numerous lower courts have
held Doyle errors to be non-structural in nature. See Gonzalez, 921 F.2d at 1550;
Leecan v. Lopes, 893 F.2d 1434 (2d Cir. 1990).
75. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

76. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
77. I4 at 776.
78. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
79. Id at 623.
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Moreover, granting habeas relief merely because there is a
'reasonable probability' that trial error contributed to the verdict
... is at odds with the historic meaning of habeas corpus-to afford
relief to those whom society has 'grievously wronged."'1
The language in Brecht thus suggests that the burden of proving
harmfulness of error on collateral review should not rest with the
prosecution but with the habeas petitioner. Indeed, three dissenters
in Brecht" explicitly noted this intimation, suggesting that the
majority's holding does, in fact, place the burden of proving a
"substantial and injurious effect" upon on the habeas petitioner.'
Justice Stevens, however, did not agree with this portion of the
majority's ruling, stating in his concurrence that the Kotteakos
standard embraced by the majority "places the burden on
prosecutors to explain why those errors were harmless."83 Justice
Stevens' dissension on the issue of burden of proof is important
because it transforms the apparently "majority" statements into
mere plurality statements. Stevens, after all, was one of the five
Justices comprising the Brecht majority; his disagreement on the
issue of burden of proof thus left only four Justices to support the
proposition that the burden of proof should be placed upon the
habeas petitioner.
In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity in
Brecht regarding the burden of proof on habeas review. In O'Neal
v. McAninch, 4 a six-three decision, the Court acknowledged that
Brecht left unresolved the issue of who bears the burden of proof."5
Interestingly, however, the O'Neal Court explicitly stated that it
did not believe that habeas review of constitutional error should be
expressed in terms of a "burden of proof."86 Rather, because habeas
80. Id at 637.

81. The four dissenters were Justices White, Blackmun, and Souter. I at
644. Justice O'Connor fied a separate dissent.

82. See id at 647 (White, J., dissenting).
83. Id at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
84. 513 U.S. 432 (1995).

85. See id at 438-39.
86. Id at 436 ("As an initial matter, we note that we deliberately phrase the
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review of constitutional trial error involves the application of a
legal standard to a trial record, the Court concluded that it was
"conceptually clearer for the [appellate] judge to ask directly, 'Do
I, the judge, think that the error substantially influenced the jury's
decision?' than for the [appellate] judge to try to put the same
question in terms of proof burdens (e.g., 'Do I believe the party has
borne its burden of showing...?')."1
O'Nealthus makes it clear that, if an appellate judge is in "grave
doubt" as to whether the error had a "substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," the judge
must conclude that the error was harmful and grant habeas relief."8
In this manner, O'Neal appears to establish a rule of thumb for
close cases. If the appellate judge looks at the trial record and finds
it "evenly balanced" such that he cannot definitively determine if
the error affected the verdict or not, O'Neal instructs the appellate
judge to err on the side of the accused and grant the habeas
petition. 9
O'Neal's rule-requiring that close cases be decided in favor of
the habeas petitioner- thus effectively operates in the same way as
if the burden of proof were placed upon the prosecutor. In other
words, if the Court had chosen to explicitly place the burden of
proof upon the prosecutor, a record in evidentiary equipoise would
mean that the prosecutor had failed to carry his burden of proof,
and the habeas petition would be granted. It is curious, therefore,
why the Court appeared so adamant about avoiding the "burden of
proof" label, when the pragmatic outcome of the O'Neal decision
is the same as placing the burden on the prosecutor. 0 The
issue in this case in terms of a judge's grave doubt, instead of in terms of 'burden
of proof.'").
87. Id at 436-37.
88. See id at 435-36.
89. See id at 437 ("The case may sometimes arise, however, where the record
is so evenly balanced that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt as to the
harmlessness of an error. This is the narrow circumstance we address here.")
(citation omitted).
90. Accord Sinnott v. Duval, 139 F.3d 12, 15 (1st. Cir. 1998).
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avoidance of the "burden of proof" label has also proven difficult
for lower courts, which appear to think instinctively in such terms.
After O'Neal, it is not unusual for lower courts still to address
habeas cases in terms of burdens of proof and-even more
interestingly-to place the burden upon the habeas petitioner. 9
In the end, adopting the Kotteakos standard rather than the
Chapman standard for harmless error on habeas review is, perhaps,
more of a semantic than substantive difference. Either standard
requires a large degree of judgment which is difficult, if not
impossible, to express with precision. AsJustice O'Connor pointed
out in her dissent in Brecht, "Kotteakos,it is true, is somewhat more
lenient; it will permit more errors to pass uncorrected. But that
simply reduces the number-of cases in which relief will be granted.
It does not decrease the burden of identifying those cases that
warrant relief."9 As Justice Stevens shrewdly noted in his
concurrence in Brecht, "In the end, the way we phrase the
governing standard is far less important than the quality of the
judgment with which it is applied."93
VI. NoN-CoNsTrruTIoNAL ERROR

A. Civil Cases
The harmless error standard for civil cases is found in Michigan
Court Rule 2.613, which uses an "inconsistent with substantial
91. See, eg., Murr v. United States, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 123, at *33 (6th
Cir. 2000) ("To warrant habeas relief because of incorrect jury instructions,
Petitioner must show that the instructions, as a whole, were so infirm that they
rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair."); United States v. Chavez, 193
F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Under [the Brecht] standard, habeas petitioners
may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not
entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it
resulted in actual prejudice."); Dearth v. Hickman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5278,
at *10 (N.D. Calif. 1999); Kouretas v. Prunty, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2881, at *5
(N.D. Calif. 1998).
92. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. Id at 643 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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justice" standard.94 A recent decision of the Michigan Supreme
Court, Merrow v. Bofferding,95 illustrates the application and
meaning of harmless error in civil litigation. In Merrow, the
plaintiff, a tenant, sued his landlord after sustaining injuries when
his arm went through a glass storm door at the residence. 6 The
plaintiff's legal theory was that the landlord was negligent in
installing or retaining the glass storm door, which the landlord
knew or should have known presented a hazard to residents and
their guests.97 The plaintiff claimed that his injury was caused when
the storm door, which had just been opened, began to close upon
his infant daughter." In an effort to stop the door from hitting his
daughter, the plaintiff stuck out his arm, shattering the plate glass,
and causing extensive injury to the plaintiff.99
The landlord's conjecture as to what caused the plaintiff's
injuries was quite different. Specifically, at trial the landlord offered
into evidence the hospital record of the plaintiff's injury, which
stated that the plaintiff "was involved in a fight with his girlfriend
and subsequently put his right arm through a plate glass
window. "1° This evidence, argued the landlord, indicated that the
plaintiff's injury had not been caused by the landlord's negligence,
but rather by the plaintiff's own intervening act."'
The plaintiff in Merrow objected to the admission of the
hospital record on grounds of hearsay. 0 2 Specifically, the plaintiff
argued that the document: (1) was not made for purposes of
diagnosis or treatment as required under the medical records
94. "An error... is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a

verdict, or for ... otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless ref~isa to
take this action appears to the court inconsistentwith substantialjustice. "MICH.
CT. P. 2.613 (emphasis added).
95. 581 N.W.2d 696 (Mich. 1998).
96. See id. at 697.

97. See id at 698.
98. See id at 697.
99. See id at 697-98.
100. Iad at 698 (emphasis omitted).
101. See id
102. See id

2000]

HARMLESS ERROR

443

hearsay exception; 0 3 and (2) was not "trustworthy" enough to
qualify under the business records hearsay exception.'" The trial
court admitted the hospital record under the hearsay exception for
business records.01° The jury then returned a special verdict in favor
of the landlord, finding that the landlord was negligent but
concluding that the landlord's "negligence was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury.""°
The plaintiff appealed the judgment, raising as a point of error
the trial court's admission of the hospital record. A divided panel
of the Michigan Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion,
reversed the judgment, concluding that the trial court had abused
its discretion in admitting the hospital record under the business
records hearsay exception. 07The Michigan Supreme Court agreed
to review the decision of the court of appeals and, in a five-two
decision, ruled in favor of the plaintiff.0 8 The court concluded that
the trial court had committed error by admitting the hospital
record, which contained hearsay within hearsay,0 9 the document
itself being admissible as a business record," 0 but the statement
within the hospital record-to the effect that the plaintiff "had a
fight with his girlfriend"-did not qualify for any hearsay
exception."'
The trial court's error in admitting the hearsay hospital record
was, moreover, harmful error, according to the Michigan Supreme
Court." 2 The court concluded that the admission of the hospital

record affected a "substantial right" of the plaintiff because the
hospital record was the key piece of evidence supporting the
landlord's theory that the plaintiff's injury was not accidental, but
103. See id.; see also MICH. R. EVID. 803(4).
104. SeeMerrow, 581 N.W.2d at 698; see also MICH. R. EVID. 803(6).
105. SeeMerrow, 581 N.W.2d at 699.
106. Id at 700 (emphasis added).
107. See id
108. See id
109. See id

110. See id
111. See id at 701.
112. See id at 704.
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deliberate."' Without the hospital record, in other words, the
landlord clearly could not have convinced the jury to find that the
landlord's negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury. Moreover, the court pointed out that the special verdict
form used by the jury clearly revealed the impact that the hospital
record had on the jury." 4 Since the jury's special verdict found the
landlord negligent, but further found that the landlord's negligence
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, the jury must have
believed the statement contained in the hospital record that the
plaintiff had been "involved in a fight with his girlfriend and
subsequently put his right arm through a plate glass window." '
Given that there was virtually no other evidence to support the
landlord's theory and the jury's conclusions as revealed by the
special verdict form, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that
the erroneous admission of the hospital record had affected a
substantial right of the plaintiff by affecting the outcome of the

jury's verdict." 6
In an earlier decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, Ilins v.
Burns,"7 two cars collided, resulting in a negligence suit between
the drivers."' No ticket was issued to either driver; however, at
trial, the defense counsel, on direct examination, asked his client
whether she had received a ticket after the collision (to which she
answered no).119 The plaintiff's counsel objected to this question on
relevancy grounds and requested a mistrial, which the trial judge
denied. 2' A police officer then took the stand, and defense counsel
asked the officer if a ticket was issued after the collision.' Before
the officer had a chance to answer the question, plaintiff's counsel
113. See id
114. See id
115. I at 698 (emphasis added).
116. See id at 704.
117. 201 N.W.2d 624 (Mich. 1972).
118. See id. at 625.
119. See idat 625-26.
120. See id at 626.
121. See id at 626-27.
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again objected to such questioning. 2The trial judge sustained the
plaintiff's objection and instructed the jury "not to consider in your
deliberations whether any traffic tickets were or were not issued to
either driver.""' The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant 24 and plaintiff appealed, citing as error the trial judge's
failure to grant a mistrial based upon the defense counsel's
1s
prejudicial questions relating to whether a ticket was issued.2
The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiff that
defense counsel's questions had a "prejudicial effect," but
nonetheless concluded that the trial judge's failure to grant the
mistrial motion was harmless error.12' Specifically, the court
concluded that the trial judge's instruction to disregard the
questions provided an adequate cure for the error."'
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, in favor of the plaintiff,
stating that "[o]nce prejudicial error is found, the cases call for
reversal regardlessofwhether the trialjudge gavean instructionin an
attempt to cure the error."12 The court further clarified that there are
three relevant factors to consider in determining whether a trial
error is "prejudicial" (i.e., harmful):
(1) "the excessiveness or unfairness of the verdict;"
(2)the "intent of counsel in introducing [the] evidence;" and
the evidence went to the substantive issues of the
(3) "whether
129
case.1
Thus, the court concluded that if the erroneously admitted
testimony is inadvertent, the error is not repeated, and proper
curative instructions are provided, the court "would uphold the
122. See id

123. Id at 627.
124. See id
125. See id
126. See id

127. See id
128. Id at 628 (emphasis added).

129. Id
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assessment of a trial judge that the error, though potentially
prejudicial, was harmless." ' 0

Applying this reasoning to the case at bar, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that the trial error was harmful because
defense counsel's questioning was "deliberate and not an incident
that inadvertently occurred"13' and the offensive line of questioning
was repeated, thereby increasing the likelihood that an instruction
would not cure the prejudicial effect upon the jury.3 Thus, in the
context of civil litigation, Ilins instructs that the provision of jury
instructions to disregard erroneously admitted evidence will often,
but not always, cure error.' However, if the error is deliberate
and/or repeated, the chances substantially increase that the error is
reversible (i.e., harmful), even if a curative instruction is provided.
B CriminalCases
In Michigan, a special statute exists to define harmless error in
criminal cases: "No judgment or verdict shall be set aside ...
unless . . . after an examination of the entire cause, it shall

affirmatively appearthat the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriageofjustice.""4 The criminal harmless error statute is thus
differentiated from its civil counterpart'35 by the addition of the
mandate that the error complained of "affirmatively appear" to
result in a miscarriage of justice. This phrase, as will be discussed
more extensively below, has been interpreted by the Michigan
Supreme Court to have significant meaning. Moreover, the criminal
130. Id

131. Id
132. See id
133. JusticeJackson once said that the idea that curative instructions can cure
otherwise prejudicial error is a "naive assumption" that "all practicing lawyers
know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,453
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).

134. MICH. COMP. LAWS S769.26 (1979) (emphasis added).
135. "An error... is not ground for... setting aside a verdict... unless
refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice." MICH. CT. R. 2.613.
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and civil standards differ in their characterization of the degree of
injustice required for the appellate court to set aside the judgment
below. Specifically, the civil harmless error statute requires that the
judgment below be "inconsistent with substantial justice" before the
appellate court may characterize the error as harmful,136 whereas
the criminal harmless error statute states that the appellate court
must find a "miscarriage of justice" before it may characterize the
error as harmful.

13 7

The question thus arises as to whether there is any substantive
distinction to be drawn between an error that is "inconsistent with
substantial justice" and one which causes a "miscarriage of justice."
At first glance, the civil standard ("inconsistent with substantial
justice") appears more conservative than the criminal standard
("miscarriage of justice") because the civil standard would permit
appellate reversal only for those errors inconsistent with a concept
of "substantial" justice, implying that "complete" justice is not
required. In other words, if an error in a civil trial can be grounds
for appellate reversal only upon a showing that "substantial" justice
has not been achieved, does this imply that something less than
complete justice is acceptable? In the criminal harmless error
statute, by contrast, any error which results in a "miscarriage of
justice" is grounds for appellate reversal, suggesting that
"justice"-not just "substantial" justice-is the hallmark in the
criminal context. This difference between "justice" and "substantial
justice" is not merely semantics. Indeed, it intuitively makes sense
for the criminal harmless error standard to be more liberal than its
civil analogue. After all, more is at stake in a criminal trial than a
civil trial; one's liberty or even life is on the line. Thus, a harmless
error standard predicated on a "miscarriage of justice"-of any
degree--indicates that society is unwilling to tolerate as many errors
in a criminal trial as it would in a civil trial." 8
136. See id

137. See MICH. COMP. LAWS S769.26 (1979).
138. We recognize, of course, that some may argue that the use of the word
"miscarriage" in the criminal harmless error standard suggests that not all errors

of justice warrant reversal, and thus that the criminal harmless error standard
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1. Peoplev. Lukity
Most errors in criminal trials, of course, do not result in a
violation of the accused's constitutional rights. In Michigan, the
harmless error standard for such non-constitutional errors has
undergone great change in recent months. Most significantly, in
July 1999, the Michigan Supreme Court decided Peoplev. Lukity.139
This five-two decision, penned byJustice Taylor, notably overruled
a 1998 decision by the court in People v. Gearns. 4
In Lukity, the jury convicted the defendant of first degree
criminal sexual conduct against his fourteen year-old daughter.141
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed Lukity's conviction,
reasoning that the cumulative effect of three separate trial errors
denied Lukity the right to a fair trial. 42 One of the three trial
errors, according to the Michigan Court of Appeals, was the
admission of evidence bolstering the daughter's character for
truthfulness before the defendant had attacked her veracity.1 43
Specifically, the prosecutor at trial was allowed to introduce
evidence from the daughter's teacher, mother, brother, and the
investigating police officer regarding her good character for
veracity, despite the fact that her veracity had not been attacked by
the defendant. 1"
The Michigan Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred

implicitly incorporates a "substantial" justice standard analogous to the civil
harmless error standard. We disagree with this argument, however, since the
phrase "miscarriage of justice" appears more likely intended to be synonymous
with "harmful to justice," suggesting more of a descriptive than substantive
standard. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 728 (1981) (defining

"miscarriage" as "a failure in the administration of justice.").
139. 596 N.W.2d 607 (Mich. 1999).
140. 577 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. 1998), overruled by People v. Lukity, 596
N.W.2d 607 (1999).
141. See Lukiry, 596 N.W.2d at 609.

142. See id
143. See id
144. See id at 610.
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in allowing such bolstering evidence to be admitted. 4 ' Once such
error had been found, the court immediately turned its attention to
the criminal harmless error statute.'" The court quickly confessed
that the statute does not address the "level of assurance" that an
appellate court must have that the error did not result in a
"miscarriage of justice." 7 The court acknowledged that, one year
earlier, a majority in People v. Gearns,"' had, in fact, agreed upon
a "level of assurance" test.' Specifically, in Gearns the court
concluded that, for non-constitutional error, the burden is on the
prosecutor to convince the appellate court that it is "highly
probable" that the erroneously admitted evidence did not affect the
15 0

verdict.

Gearns thus created a presumption that a non-constitutional
error is harmful (i.e., requires reversal) unless the prosecutor
demonstrates that it is "highly probable" that the error was, in fact,
harmless."5 ' The Lukity majority explicitly overruled Gearns,
substituting in its place two rather remarkable new rules. First (and
most importantly), Lukity shifted the burden of persuasion from
the prosecution to the criminal defendant. 2 Second, Lukity
substituted the "highly probable" standard for a new, less rigorous
"more probable than not"standard of proof."
The burden shift of Lukity-from prosecutor onto the criminal
defendant-was necessitated, according to the Michigan Supreme
Court, by the language of the Michigan criminal harmless error
statute. s4 Specifically, the court stated that placing the burden upon
the prosecutor, as had been done in Gearns,was inconsistent with
the language of section 26 because "Section 26 states that the types
145. See id at 610-11.
146. See id. at 611.
147. See id. at 611-12.
148. 577 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. 1998).

149. See Lukity, 596 N.W.2d at 611-12.
150. See id. at 611; see also Gearrs,577 N.W.2d at 438.
151. See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 437-38.
152. See Lukity, 596 N.W.2d at 611-13.
153. See id. at 612-13.

154. See id. at 611-12.
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of errors listed are not grounds for reversal unless it shall
'affirmatively appear' that such error resulted in a miscarriage of
justice."155 Thus, the use of the phrase "affirmatively appear" in the

Michigan criminal harmless error statute was interpreted by the
court as imposing a presumption that errors in criminal trials are
harmless.It is only if the criminal defendant introduces evidence by
which it "affirmatively appears" that the error resulted in a
miscarriage of justice that errors in criminal trials may be deemed
harmful. The phrase "affirmatively appear," thus interpreted, was
intended by the Michigan legislature to shift the burden of proof
onto the criminal defendant.
This conclusion by the court was certainly not without
controversy, even among the Justices themselves. Justice Brickley
reluctantly concurred with the majority's conclusion as to the
burden of proof, concluding that "as a matter of policy [the 'highly
probable' standard of Gearns] is appropriate, [however,] I am
unable to reconcile the Gearnstest with Michigan's harmless error
statute. The statute states that the verdict should not be disturbed
unless 'it shall affirmatively appear' that the error was prejudicial.
with this language than
The majority's standard is more consistent
156
Geams."
in
forth
set
we
the standard
Two dissenters in Lukity, Justices Cavanagh and Kelly, took
issue with the majority's interpretation of the phrase "affirmatively
appear":
In the words 'affirmatively appear' ... the majority finds

lurking a rebuttable presumption of harmlessness. While the
word 'affirmatively'

...

must be surely be given meaning,

[we] cannot fathom any definition of the word that includes
a meaning such as 'in sufficient fashion as to defeat a
rebuttable presumption of harmlessness.' And yet, that is
how the majority 'reads' the statute ...

155. Id.
156. I at 617 (Brickley, J., concurring).

157. Id at 618 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).

15
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The dissenters thus believed the phrase was not intended by the
Michigan Legislature to shift the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the criminal defendant. Instead, they believed that
"[a] more literal and simpler definition of affirmatively, which, in
its various forms, implies an assertion that something is true, might
well speak more to a court having some level of assurancethan it
does to any rebuttable presumption. While claiming (correctly)
that S 26 'controls' our inquiry, the majority must, in effect, add a
considerable amount of text to the statute in order for it to
'control' its chosen result."' The dissenters therefore interpret the
phrase "affirmatively appear" to denote a "level of assurance" rather
than an indication of who bears the burden of proof. In other
words, the phrase "affirmatively appear" was intended by the
legislature to indicate that an appellate court reviewing a claim of
harmful error in a criminal trial must have a relatively high level of
assurance that the claimed error was, in fact, harmful, before it
would be appropriate to overturn the defendant's conviction. The
claimed error thus must "affirmatively" appear to the appellate
court to be harmful before setting aside the conviction. Thus
viewed, the phrase does not necessarily implicate the separate
question regarding who-prosecutor or criminal defendant-bears
the burden of convincing the appellate court that the error
affirmatively appears.
The Lukity dissenters also took issue with the pragmatic
implications of the majority's decision to shift the burden of proof
upon the criminal defendant:
Exactly how, I would ask, will this presumption ever be
rebutted?. . . . [T]he appellate court (particularly if it
sanctions inference piling) will always be in a position to
state 'a reasonable jury could have found' and rely on
whatever untainted testimony... exists in the record. The
majority has constructed a hurdle that cannot be cleared,
not because of its height, but because of the wall on the
158. Id
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other side." 9
By shifting the burden upon the criminal defendant to prove that
the trial error was harmful, the Lukity majority requires that the
criminal defendant convince the appellate court that, but for the
trial error, the defendant would have been acquitted. If there is
other, untainted evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt upon
which a reasonable jury could rely, the appellate court is, under
Lukity, instructed to affirm the conviction.
The emphasis of Lukity is thus on getting the "right result" and
disregarding all errors in criminal trials that are not proven by the
defendant to have resulted in a wrongful conviction. On the one
hand, such a standard makes instinctive sense, both from a
philosophical and economic standpoint. Philosophically, Lukity
ensures that criminal convictions are not set aside by appellate
courts unless the appellate court is convinced-by the
defendant-that the trial error resulted in a conviction that would
not otherwise have occurred. In this way, appellate courts are
instructed by Lukity to affirm the vast majority of convictions so
long as there is a sufficient quantum of untainted evidence upon
which to base the defendant's conviction. Viewed this way, the
conviction is "right" based upon the evidence, so why should we,
societally, reverse it? Moreover, by placing. the burden of proof
upon the criminal defendant, Lukity serves as a deterrent to appeals
of criminal convictions. Thus, from an economic standpoint, there
are likely to be fewer appeals of criminal convictions clogging the
already crowded dockets of Michigan courts and taxpayers will not
have to fund as many retrials that are likely to result in the same
verdict. 160 It is evident, therefore, that Lukity is far removed from
159. Id at 619 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
160. Of course, one could argue that, by making reversal of criminal

convictions more difficult, Lukity may be viewed as economically inefficient due
to the resulting increase in the prison population. Whether this is true or not is
unclear, since the size of the prison population is dependent upon numerous
other factors not affected by Lukity, including availability of parole, sentencing
decisions, and culture.

2000]

HARMLESS ERROR

the common law conception of the "appearance of justice." Justice,
as it appears today, is a broader, more attainable concept. Technical
errors in a criminal trial no longer automatically taint the
appearance of justice. Justice is achieved, in short, if the jury
reached the "right result" (i.e., in accordance with the evidence),
even if there were one or more errors committed by the trial court.
The Lukity decision is also notable because of its holding
regarding the standard-or level of proof-that it establishes. In
other words, not only did Lukity decide that the burden of proof
should fall upon the criminal defendant, but it also tells us what
quantum of evidence the criminal defendant must introduce in
order to convince the appellate court that the alleged error was
harmful. Specifically, Lukity requires the criminal defendant to
prove that it is "more probable than not" that the error affected the
trial verdict.1 6' According to the majority, this standard was also
necessitated by the language of the criminal harmless error
statute. 6 2 Specifically, the majority concluded that because
"[s]ection 26 places the burden on a defendant to demonstrate a
miscarriage of justice, any higher standard, e.g., 'highly probable,'
would place a greater burden on defendants than Section 26
envisions."'6
This reference to the "highly probable" standard is clearly
intended to address the court's previous holding in Gearns,which
had ruled that the prosecution bore the burden of proving that it
was "highly probable" that an alleged error was harmless.'" Once
the Lukity majority concluded that the criminal harmless error
statute mandated that the burden of proof be placed upon the
criminal defendant (i.e., that the burden of proof allocation of
Gearnsbe overruled), it appeared hesitant to impose a quantum of
proof standard higher than "more probable than not." Geams, in
other words, was wrong on both counts: its interpretation of the
criminal harmless error statute as placing the burden of proof upon
161. See Lukity, 596 N.W.2d at 613.

162. See id at 611-12.
163. Ideat 612.

164. See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d 422, 438 (Mich. 1998).
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the prosecution was wrong, as was its interpretation of the statute
relating to the quantum of evidence required to be adduced. The
court's 1998 decision in Gearns, of course, purported to be an
interpretation of the same criminal harmless error statute that was
being interpreted in Lukity. Yet the court-one short year
later-reached a completely different interpretation. In dissent,
Justices Cavanagh and Kelly took issue with the majority's aboutface: "Gearns and its companion were not easy cases, and there
certainly was no lack of deliberation or debate among the Court.
Now, but a year later, we are summarily told that Gearns was
wrongly decided... ."16 The vitriolic dissenters also appeared to
question the motives of the Justices in the majority, stating that
Justice Taylor and the Chief Justice, upon finding that there
is now a majority.., to join them, are.., free to cast their
formerly rejected view as our new rule. Such endeavors,
however, are likely to suggest that the decisions of this
Court are only as stable as its composition, and that changes
in it might be presumed by some to evidence a mandate for
wholesale changes in the other, even in the absence of the
passage of time, changes in circumstances, or any other of
the more noble reasons to reevaluate our past decisions.166
Whether one agrees with the holding of Lukity or not, the
court's sudden reinterpretation of the language of the criminal
harmless error statute is baffling. The language of the statute did
not change in the intervening year between Gearns and Lukity.
Indeed, as Justices Cavanagh and Kelly point out in their dissent,
the only thing that did appear to change in the intervening year was
the composition of the Michigan Supreme Court. And while it is
certainly true that each jurist brings to the court his or her own
views, it is equally true that the rule of staredecisis is supposed to
temper fluctuations in the law predicated on the individual ideology
165. Lukity, 596 N.W.2d at 617 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).

166. Id at 617 n.1 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
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of members of the bench. Given that Justices of the Michigan
Supreme Court are elected, perhaps the reverence generally given
to stare decisis is naive.
2. People v. Graves
One additional recent Michigan Supreme Court case is worth
noting regarding non-constitutional error in a criminal trial. In
People v. Graves, 67 the defendant was charged with first degree
murder. "At the close of the prosecution's case, defense counsel
moved for a directed verdict of acquittal regarding the first-degree
murder charge. The trial court denied the motion and instructed
the jury that it could find [Graves] guilty of first-degree murder,
second-degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter,""16 or that it
could find Graves not guilty.169 The jury found Graves guilty of
voluntary manslaughter, and Graves appealed the conviction,
arguing that the trial court "erred in submitting the first degree
murder charge to the jury. "" Specifically, Graves argued that the
first degree murder charge submission was unwarrranted by the
proof because there was no evidence of premeditation and
17
deliberation. 1
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed Graves' conviction,
holding that the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in People
v. Vail, 72 required automatic reversal.1" Vail held that
where a jury is permitted consideration of a charge
unwarranted by the proofs there is always prejudice because
a defendant's chances of acquittal on any valid charge is
substantially decreased by the possibility of a compromise
167. 581 N.W.2d 229 (Mich. 1998).
168. Id. at 231.
169. See id
170. Id
171. Seeid
172. 227 N.W.2d 535 (Mich. 1975).
173. See Graves, 581 N.W.2d at 231.
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verdict. For this reason it is reversible error for a trial judge
to refuse a directed verdict of acquittal on any charge where
the prosecution has failed to present evidence from which
1 4
the jury could find all elements of the crime charged.
Vail thus set forth a rule of automatic reversal for a specific type of
preserved, non-constitutional error (submission of a charge
unwarranted by the proof). And while the Michigan Court of
Appeals in Gravesreversed the defendant's conviction based upon
the automatic reversal rule of Vail, they did so reluctantly. Indeed,
two of the court of appeals judges urged the Michigan Supreme
Court to overrule Vail." 5
Not surprisingly, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed to review
the decision of the court of appeals in Graves. In a close, four-tothree decision, the supreme court accepted the invitation of the
court of appeals to overrule Vail, concluding that "the automatic
reversal rule of Vail is inconsistent with this Court's modem
harmless-error jurisprudence." 6 The court specifically found that
Vail was inconsistent with the language of the Michigan criminal
harmless error statute which, by its terms, does not appear to
require automatic reversal for any criminal trial errors. 17 The court
further reasoned that criminal defendants have "no room to
complain" if a charge is improperly submitted to the jury, so long
as the defendant is acquitted of the improperly submitted charge
and the basis of the defendant's conviction is a "charge that was
properly submitted to the jury." 8 Requiring automatic reversal in
such situations-as Vail required-is disrespectful of juries because
automatic reversal is premised on speculation that jurors
compromise their views in violation of their instructions.179 Finally,
the Graves court noted that the automatic reversal rule of Vail
174. Vail, 227 N.W.2d at 536.
175. See People v. Graves, 569 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
176. Graves, 581 N.W.2d at 232.

177. See idat 233.
178. Id
179. See ia at 234.
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results in an inefficient use of scarce judicial resources "by
automatically reversing an otherwise valid conviction. " "
The three dissenters in Graves-Justices Cavanagh, Mallett, and
Kelly-defended the automatic reversal rule of Vail on the grounds
that it was consistent with the "highly probable" standard for nonconstitutional error pronounced in Gearns.151 The majority, of
course, disagreed, perhaps intimating the court's forthcoming
reversal of Gearnsin the Lukity decision.
What is to be learned from Graves beyond perhaps that it
foretold the outcome in Lukity? There are likely two alternative
ways of viewing the holding in Graves. The narrow holding of
Graves is that submission to a criminal jury of a charge not
warranted by the proof is not grounds for automatic reversal (i.e.,
it is not per se harmful error). A broader view of the holding in
Graves-andone that is more consistent with the court's decision
in Lukity-is that, because of the language of the criminal harmless
error statute, non-constitutional errors can never result in
automatic reversal. Indeed, after the court's decision in Lukity, it is
reasonable to presume that all appeals based upon nonconstitutional errors will require that the criminal defendant
convince the appellate court that the error "more probably than
not" affected the outcome of the trial.
VII. CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to answer the deceptively simple
question, "What is 'harmless' error in Michigan?" As we hope we
have demonstrated, answering this question is a complex task that
requires the consideration of numerous factors, including: (1)Was
the alleged error preserved or unpreserved at the trial level? (2) Did
the alleged error involve a violation of the party's constitutional
rights? (3)If the alleged error involved a violation of constitutional
rights, is the constitutional error structural or non-structural in
180. ld

181. ld at 236 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:423

nature? (4) If the alleged error involved a violation of constitutional
rights, is the point of error being raised on direct or habeas corpus
review? (5) If the alleged error did not involve a violation of
constitutional rights, did the error occur in a civil or criminal trial?
How one answers these basic questions will provide a basic
indication of the test, or standard, for harmless error that a court
would apply, as well as an indication as to who would bear the
burden of proving that the error is harmful (or harmless).
On a deeper level, the "standard" adopted for harmless error,
and the allocation of the burden of proving it, reveals a policy
judgment about the level of assurance that an appellate court
requires before it will reverse a judgment. Thus, courts reserve the
highest standard-automatic reversal-for structural constitutional
errors raised on direct review-a type of trial error courts deem to
be the most serious and likely to be prejudicial. Somewhat lower
standards (e.g., the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for nonstructural constitutional errors raised on direct review) likewise
reveal a need to have a very high level of assurance in the
correctness of the verdict before a court will affirm a conviction on
appeal. Still lower standards (e.g., "more probable than not"
standard for non-constitutional errors on direct review or the
Kotteakos standard for habeas review requiring affirmance unless
the defendant can show a "substantial and injurious effect") reveal
a lesser need for assurance in the correctness of the verdict before
a court will affirm it on appeal. Moreover, to whom we allocate the
burden of proof is clearly a policy decision reflecting what the
outcome of an appeal should be in a close case. Thus, for example,
by shifting the burden onto the criminal defendant in Lukity, the
court expressed its belief that the Michigan Legislature wanted
appellate courts to affirm rather than reverse criminal convictions
in a close case.
In the end, a simple, uniform definition of harmless error
proves elusive in Michigan as elsewhere. But if one understands the
purpose of harmless error, one begins to see that the bewildering
array of standards reflect a common idea: that courts should
customize the definition of harmless error to reflect the degree of
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seriousness to which society ascribes particular types of trial error
and our varying notions of "justice" in particular types of cases.
Viewed this way, harmless error in Michigan is still a riddle, but a
riddle with an answer to which one can make an educated guess.

